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INTRODUCTION

Both the European Union and the United States are engaged in the
"restructuring" of their electricity industries. In a major conceptual break
from the past, both societies see that specially designed markets can
function in that industry. Yet, while market strategies are feasible in the
generation and distribution/marketing segments, the bulk or wholesale
transmission segment-the "big wires" that connect the generators with the
consumers-challenges market solutions. The EU Commission has
recently proposed a new round of restructuring legislation, known as the
"third package." The EU reforms rely generally on command-and-control
regulation to assure the public regarding performance by bulk transmission
entities. The U.S. experience suggests that the European Union is trying to
"do it the hard way." The United States has been moving to an
organizational model known in U.S. administrative law as "collaborative
governance." Collaborative governance concentrates on broad
participation, inclusion of all the stakeholders, and transparency to assure
the public regarding performance. This article examines the problems
identified in the third package as they might be met-and to a large extent
as they have been met in the U.S.-by the collaborative governance
approach. Its goal is to generate a transatlantic dialogue on these issues.
The U.S. electricity industry has evolved a collaborative governance
model and that model now dominates U.S. electricity restructuring.
Significantly, the shift to this organizational model has been driven by the
industry and market participants with government encouragement rather
than command. Collaborative governance concentrates on joint problem
solving and controlled discretion. 1 It strives to be inclusive rather than
adversarial by bringing into the governing entity itself all the stakeholders.
It is based on public/private collaboration, founded on the interaction
among governmental and private governmental-type entities. Because it is
controlled by those directly affected, it naturally gravitates to
1. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REv. I, 22 (1997); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REv. 1285 (2003); see also Sallyanne Payton, "Professionalism as Third-Party
Governance: The Function and Dysfunction of Medicare," in MAKING GOVERNMENT
MANAGEABLE: EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 112-40 (Thomas H.Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2004). Professor Payton has for years explored this concept in her course "Law of
Cooperative Federalism."
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organizational structures dictated by technical and economic realities,
rather than insisting on suboptimum political boundaries. Discussed below
is the emerging U.S. collaborative governance model and how this model
might address the problems recently identified by the EU authorities?
I.

SHARED PROBLEM

For generations, both Europe and the U.S. policymakers have assumed
that the market cannot serve the public interest in the electricity industry.
They assumed that the most efficient industry form is a monopoly or at
least that the larger the firms, the better. The governmental task then
seemed to be control of the market domination inherent in this industry
structure. In the United States, the solution was regulated private
monopolies while Europe tended toward state-managed monopolies.
Today, on collective reflection, both societies now see that specially
structured markets can be an improvement over either direct regulation or
direct government control.
A pure market solution in all electricity regimes is challenged by three
characteristics. First, the product is totally undifferentiated. Second, the
product cannot be economically stored and hence it is the ultimate
perishable commodity. Third, it cannot be directed from a source to a
specific end user but must be made to flow toward that user. This last
characteristic creates the greatest challenge to market solutions.
Identifying an actual exchange of a particular product between the producer
and the consumer is at best a fiction. A generator adds some artificially
designated quantity of electricity into the flow and a consumer "pulls"
those artificially designated units out of the flow. The generator may
charge for adding the quantity and the consumer may be charged for taking
that quantity out, but only in the most abstract and largely dysfunctional
way may a consumer be said to purchase the electricity from a specific
producer. 3 Yet, while the producer does not actually sell the electricity
2. The most recent iteration of the EU electricity policy is called the Third Package.
Two proposals in this Third Package are the focus of this discussion: "Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/54/EC of
the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity et al." (hereinafter Internal Market Proposal); "Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No.
1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchange in electricity"
(hereinafter Cross-Border Proposal). The Third Package was supported by a Commission
study: "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy"
(2006) (hereinafter Electricity Green Paper).
3. The market obstacles presented by these characteristics can be envisioned by
considering a person in Spain buying a cup of water from someone in the United States. The
person in the United States delivers the water by pouring it into the Atlantic Ocean; the
purchaser dips a cup of water out of the Ocean. In theoretical compliance with the contract,
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produced to the consumer, it is increasingly recognized that a market
solution can be pursued. The generators may be made to compete and the
consumers may capture the benefits from this competitive market. In order
to do so, however, the market solution must be adjusted to the special nature
of electricity. These industry characteristics present a conundrum for every
designer of a public-regarding electricity industry, American (both
continents), European, Asian, and increasingly the remainder of the world. 4
The first step is segregation of the three major segments of the industry
and developing competition in production and distribution/marketing. The
PJM website offers a helpful illustration of how an electric power system
operates. 5
II. PROFILE OF THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM6
Both EU and U.S. restructuring then begins with "unbundling" these
three segments-i.e., separating control (and/or ownership) of generation,
bulk transmission, and distribution/marketing.
Bulk transmission presents the challenge. In a pure market approach,
the generators must "buy" competitively priced transmission and that price
must be included in the retail price. Unfortunately, bulk or wholesale
transmission-the "big wires" that connect the generators with the
consumers-do in fact meet the condition for a "natural monopoly." 7 An
ordinary market in transmission is inefficient, if not impossible. On the
other hand, control of the big wires represents a dominant, "bottleneck"
position which can cancel the market solutions in the generation and
distribution/marketing segments. Thus, the challenge in creating an
electricity market is structuring a market-friendly bulk transmission system
the seller delivered a cup into the system and the buyer took a cup out. Yet it is hard to even
claim that the buyer bought the seller's water. The transportation of the seller's cup never
really takes place and the cup withdrawn really comes from an unidentifiable source. This is
electricity. One operating abstraction has been the "contract path fiction," in which everyone
ignores reality. This fiction creates distortions in the market of electricity. Answers begin
with thinking outside the bilateral contract thinking.
4. See generally Thomas von Danwitz, Regulation and Liberalization of the European
Market-A German View, 27 ENERGY L.J. 423 (2006); Tun-jen Cheng & Chung-min Tsai,
"Powering Rent-Seeking in China's Electricity Industry," in RENT-SEEKING IN CHINA, (Tagwing Ngo & Yong-ping Wu eds. 2008); Larry Pascal, South American Electricity-2006
Year in Review, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 335 (2007).
5. Profile of an Electric Power System, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjmlhow-weoperate.aspx.
6. Profile of the Electricity System, http://www.pjm.com/about/overview.html.
7. A "natural monopoly" exists where the firm's average cost continues to fall within
any feasible range of production and hence one producer can produce all requirements at the
lowest cost. JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
241-42 (6th ed. 1998). In electricity, the advantage derives not just from "economies of
scale" but also a vague concept called "subadditivity." PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC
UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE ERA 8 ( 1997).
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in light of the three special characteristics of the electricity.
The challenge then is to enable a competitive market among generators
and retail marketers-industries we now understand may efficiently
operate under conditions of competition-when the producers can only be
said to add to the flow from which the distributors/marketers draw when
the flow is controlled by a bottleneck entity. For most of the 20th century,
the solution was a vertically integrated utility that generated, transported,
and marketed the electricity. The consumer simply contracted with the
utility; the rest of the operation was coordinated within the utility. The
utility coordinated the generation, transmission, and marketing of
electricity. This vertically integrated industry presented serious economic
and social problems. 8 Since this monopolist could and did act as a
monopolist, this structure presents the danger of a social "welfare loss" in
which the system produces less electricity at a higher price than would a
market. 9 This welfare loss was addressed by some sort of government
intervention, either regulation or direct government management (i.e.,
nationalization).
Both solutions created their own distortions, including inadequate
control of the performance of the integrated entity. Regulation became
more about politics and advocacy than efficiency. National ownership
faced both direct political pressures and the inherent deficiencies of lack of
economic incentives and bureaucratic decisionmaking. Both European and
U.S. societies sought ways to break out of this box. The answer was sought
in more nuanced market orientation and less direct government involvement.
Yet the special nature of an electricity industry has not changed and the
obstacles to a market approach are still present. In the end, the laws of
physics still rule and the laws of man must still yield place to nature's laws.
The United States and the European Union (and the world) share this
problem and should dialogue on solutions. While this paper highlights an
emerging U.S. solution, it does so to further a global dialogue.

8. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten in the enthusiasm for market
coordination that the "theory of the firm" literature demonstrates the potential efficiencies of
this model: "[Firms were created for] two interrelated reasons: (1) to take advantage of team
production, and (2) to reduce contracting costs." Hirshleifer, supra note 7, at 160. The
second in particular should give some pause for the electricity unbundling projects.
9. Hirshleifer, supra note 7, at 237 ("In comparison with the competitive outcome,
monopoly involves a transfer from consumer to suppliers. There is also an efficiency
loss .... ").
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III. EVOLUTION OF U.S. ELECTRICITY POLICY

A. Major Shift in U.S. Regulatory Strategy
A major shift in the theory of U.S. electricity regulation started not with
Congress or administrative authorities such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Department of Energy (DOE), but
with antitrust litigation. 10 The story begins with the Supreme Court's
opinion in Otter Tai/. 11 Since the end of the 19th century, the electricity
industry was always considered a "natural monopoly" and hence ordinary
application of the competition laws was deemed inappropriate. This theory
spawned regulatory regimes in which rate and performance regulation aimed
to create the performance of a competitive market while retaining the costeffectiveness of the monopoly.
While some economists increasingly
questioned this theory, a policy shift would not take place until the Supreme
Court in Otter Tail found that competition was possible and that the
electricity industry to the extent possible should incorporate market forces.
Congress made a few tentative attempts to encourage a market
approach. 12 However, it was FERC that initiated the first meaningful step
toward restructuring the industry. The real beginning of efforts to inject
market elements into the whole electricity industry was a FERC rule called
Order 888. 13 This "open access rule" provided an impressive foundation
for this restructuring. 14 Order 888 ordered functional unbundling, finding
that ownership divestiture was not necessary. It sought to divide control of
the
three
industry
segments-generation,
transmission,
and
distribution/marketing. A market in generation seemed plausible if the
generators were separated from the integrated utilities. Likewise, a market
10. The two most significant and lasting pieces of early energy legislation relevant to
this discussion are Part II of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824a-825r, passed in
1933, and the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq., passed in 1938.
11. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). This case is seminal
because it recognized the possibility of competition in the electricity industry and hence
began the restructuring movement. Significant even today is the example of abusive
behavior by the large, integrated utility. The utility attempted to drive out competition from
small municipal utilities that were able to sell electricity well below the dominant utility.
Such conduct continues to be a potential danger.
12. Major efforts include the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA)
(encouraging limited generator competition) and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (expanding
the types of generators that could sell deregulated wholesale power).
13. Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Cost by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (hereinafter Order 888).
14. It was adopted through the basic U.S. "legislative rules"-rules made pursuant to
delegated authority which have the "power of law"-set out in § 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The statement accompanying this rule is an impressive example of
this process.
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in distribution would be created if customers were able to choose among
retail marketers. Again, the key was separating the distribution segment
from the integrated utility. Markets at the two ends, so to speak, proved
possible, if not without difficulty. However, a traditional market in
transmission-the operation of the big wires--eluded even theoretical
designs. Transmission had to be an integrated whole and yet the countermarket opportunities remained after unbundling. To confront these
opportunities, FERC looked to a structure that had been developed by
members of the industry itself. It encouraged reorganization in which bulk
transmission would be managed by not-for-profit organizations called
independent systems operators (ISOs ). 15
Europeans must be immediately alerted to the fact that ISO organization
as used in the United States is almost the exact opposite from the
independent system operator option offered as an alternative by the EU
Commission. The U.S. version of ISO is a not-for-profit system manager
but the EU uses the term to designate an ordinary business entity:
This option, a derogation from the basic ownership unbundling approach, is
know as the "Independent System Operator." This option enables vertically
integrated companies to retain the ownership of their network assets, but
requires that the transmission network itself is managed by an independent
system operator-an undertaking or entity separate from the vertically
integrated company-that performs all the functions of a network operator.
In addition, to ensure that the operator remains and acts truly independently
of the vertically integrated comiany, regulation and permanent regulatory
1
monitoring must be put in place.

Thus, the EU version of the ISO does not differ from the "preferred"
version, except in the ISO alternative the ownership remains with the utility
and in the preferred version the ownership is separated-but not by much.
Neither alternative matches the U.S. ISO concept in which the focus is not
on ownership but on management by an entity governed by all the
stakeholders and hence truly independent.
This management organization of the big wires was in some sense
privileged by FERC's open-access structure. Furthermore, embedded in
the FERC open-access options was a move toward regional (multistate)
design. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), already existing in
many regions, preside over an entity whose function was divided
geographically according to the most efficient and effective physical and
economic organization. In the original Power Act, Congress carved out,

15. For a history of U.S. electricity restructuring, see RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss:
THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY
SYSTEM ( 1999).
16. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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largely for political reasons, a role for state regulators. 17 It became
established doctrine that states were given jurisdiction to regulate "retail"
and the federal regulators retained power over "wholesale." 18 Order 888
envisioned a structure in which federal regulation would impose optimum
markets with necessarily softened state-defined industry components. In
New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the FERC
approach. 19
B. The ISO/RTO Solution

FERC made a very wise choice: it encouraged the industry itself to offer
open-access designs that eliminated anticompetitive control from a central
entity. Almost a natural consequence of unbundling was industry shift to
ISO/RTO models. 20 This organizational model, which had emerged over
sixty years, manages the big wires and usually makes a market in
electricity, unencumbered by state or, in some cases, national boundaries.
It also provides auxiliary services, control of which also presents the
potential for anticompetitive conduct. In North America, ISOs and RTOs
represent 67% of electricity customers in the United States and over half of
those in Canada. 21
This Article centers on the ISO/RTO model. The model's chart is
available on the ISO/RTO Council's website. 22 The discussion below
generally equates interconnection among U.S. states with that among EU
Member States. As can be seen from this chart, however, to be discussed
further below, there is considerable cross-border cooperation between ISOs
17. See Rhode Island Pub. Uti!. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 275 U.S. 83
(1927) (holding that the states could not regulate industries in interstate commerce and
hence, for the states to have jurisdiction, the power had to be delegated by the federal
government).
18. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271,276 (1976) ("The prohibition
against discriminatory or preferential rates or services imposed by § 205(b) and the
Commission's power to set just and reasonable rates under [FPA §] 206(a) are accordingly
limited to sales 'subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,' that is, to sales of electric
energy at wholesale. The Commission has no power to prescribe the rate for retail sales of
power companies.").
19. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. I (2002). Indeed, Justice Thomas, in a separate
opinion, found that FERC had jurisdiction over transmission transactions including those
taking place within a state. See id. at 42 (Thomas, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Finally, to the extent that FERC has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over
transmission connected to bundled retail sales, it ignores the clear statutory mandate.").
20. 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2006) (setting out FERC's technical requirements).
21. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, HARNESSING THE POWER OF DEMAND: How lSOs AND RTOS
ARE INTEGRATING DEMAND RESPONSE INTO WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2007),
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B584E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD% 70/IRC
_D R_Report_l 0 1607. pdf.
Operating
Regions,
22. ISO/RTO
http://www. isorto.org/site/c.jhKQ IZPBimE/b.26044 71 /k.B 14E/Map.htm.
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in Canada and the United States. The organizational union often operates
as if it were one entity. Thus, the organizational structure transcends
political borders and may be seen as operating across international as well
as interstate borders. The freer from political constraints in general, the
more likely the boundaries will be determined by physical and market
efficiencies. But, relevant to this paper, the greater the variety of private
and governmental stakeholders brought into these entities, the greater the
challenge to their governance organization.
C. Collaborative Governance Model in Electricity

Participatory governance is essential to the comfort level of finns that
cede some control to an independent authority. For this reason, ISO/RTO
governance enhances industry participation in joint action to facilitate
efficient markets and reliability. Equally important, however, is that
ISO/RTOs provide direct participation by nonindustry stakeholders,
including consumers and various governments. The ISO/RTO model's
inclusiveness and transparency gives it legitimacy. The collaborativegovernance strategy of the ISO/RTO system, then, is a key to its success.
Collaborative governance seeks to reorient tile conceptualization of
administrative process around techniques of joint problem solving and
controlled discretion. 23 It seeks an alternative to adversarial government
and explores concepts and processes which might replace interest-group
contests with cooperation and dialogue? 4 It fosters the development of a
coherent theoretic framework for those experimenting with alternatives
based on positive problem solving rather than contestibility and coercion.
It engenders information sharing, accountability, and broad participation
and deliberation. 25 It enables evolutionary decisionrnaking in which
solutions to immediate problems do not foreclose rethinking of both
solutions and goals. It envisions synergistic government and broadens
potential roles of public agencies, such as serving as facilitators and
23. Collaborative governance is characterized by five features: problem-solving
orientation; participation by interested and affected persons at all stages of the
decisionmaking process; solutions that are provisional and subject to revision;
accountability; and flexible, engaged government institutions. Freeman, supra note I, at 22.
24. Americans, not just their lawyers, have a great deal of difficulty with such
behavioral norms. Much of the rest of the world finds it easier to engage in community
dispute resolution. Our instinctive competitiveness is our strength and our weakness. Here,
as perhaps elsewhere, this instinct can inhibit the attainment of the ultimate goal. Our
inability to engage in cooperative decisionmaking may accrue to our comparative
disadvantage in the increasingly interconnected world.
25. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 N.W. U.L. REv. 173 (1997) (explaining that, while
U.S. administrative law exults participation, the central consideration must be optimizing
deliberation).
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information clearinghouses. Yet, while government may guide and
monitor performance, it does not dictate operations. As Professor Freeman
observed, "A collaborative perspective requires that we reconceive the
relationship and responsibilities among public and private actors in the
regulatory process." 26 For these reasons, it seems to speak directly to the
evolving electricity industry.
Through the ISO/RTO model, the collaborative-governance package has
transformed governance in the electricity industry. Careful attention to the
instrumental value of participation as well as its normative value is
nowhere more important that in electricity governance.
Indeed,
collaborative problem solving changes the conceptualization of the
interaction among the interests. Electricity governance is a complex
prisoner's dilemma in which individual self-interest may in fact diminish
the payoff for everyone, unlike most business relationships in which
competition has social value. Mutual trust is obviously not enough and
hence positive governance is necessary. The governance structure must be
effective and fair-and appear to be effective and fair. Tile ISO/RTO
model then serves the complex problem-solving challenges of the
electricity industry. At the same time, it satisfies all the various interests in
which they are involved in substance as well as form.
The oldest RTO, PJM, may well serve as an exemplar. 27 This RTO
originally managed grids in the neighboring U.S. states of Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Maryland; hence its name. PJM was started by electric
utilities in 1927 and became the first PERC-certified R TO in 1997. It has
been extremely successful, growing to include 450 members in 15 MidAtlantic states. It manages over 56,000 miles of transmission lines and
164,905 MW of generation. PJM covers 1,271 generating sources and
serves over 51 million customers. Thus, it fosters vibrant competition
between producers and provides choices for customers and marketers.
In the PJM governance system, the central authority is the Board of
Managers. The Board is charged with operating a fair, nondiscriminatory
electricity market. The Board may have no person who has a personal
affiliation or ongoing professional relationship or financial stake in any
PJM market participant. A Members Committee provides advice to the
Board. That Committee has representatives from the key segments:
generators, transmission owners, distributors, marketers, and consumers. A
Nominating Committee fills vacancies on the Board. Various specialized
committees, such as the Reliability Committee or the Finance Committee,

26. Freeman, supra note I, at 97.
27. A great deal of information about the issues discussed here and otherwise is
available on the PJM website, http://www.pjm.com.
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work to refine and improve rules, policies, and processes. Input also comes
from user groups.
ISO/RTOs such as PJM engage in self-regulation of their various
members. PJM's Market Monitoring Unit guards against the exercise of
market power by any market member. The industry itself developed this
concept to engender trust among market participants, including
competitors. The Unit analyzes market data and takes action to make
structural or rule changes. Self-regulation has been very successful in
several U.S. industries, such as the securities industry. Members of the
industry itself are much harder to fool than government regulators. On the
other hand, they are sensitive to the needs of industry participants. When
self-regulation works, it is both more effective and less burdensome to the
industry. An independent transmission organization responsible for the
industry's integrity offers the most effective monitor. For one thing, selfmonitoring creates legitimacy in that part of the industry that cannot be
protected by market forces. In the end, the industry benefits from keeping
its own house clean rather than dealing with intrusive governmental
interference.
Another advantage of independent transmission management is its
dispute-resolution machinery. Any environment with so many actors will
create numerous disputes. For example, sometimes generators are unable
to meet their delivery promise, customers may not want the delivery, or
repairs may be negligent or slow. An effective transmission manager must
efficiently settle such disputes. An ISO/RTO has the status, resources, and
independence to do so. It is a better alternative to govenunent regulatory
mechanisms or judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms.
In sum, the private government-like services-including management,
rulemaking, enforcement, and dispute settlement-solve many of the
governmental tasks without many of the disadvantages of direct
governmental involvement. Such entities serve well the sophisticated and
complex tasks involved in governing the core segment of the electricity
industry, bulk transmission.
Fairness, competence, efficiency, and
legitimacy radiate out to the entire industry and ultimately to the society it
serves.
IV. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS

The EU has confronted electricity restructuring at three levels: treaty
revision, statute-like measures, and pan-European and Member State
administrative implementation. A brief summary of EU developments is
necessary here. 28
28. For a brief overview of EU law and government, see
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A. Treaty Recognition of Energy

The basic or "constitutional" documents of the EU have been created by
the various treaties signed by European nations admitted into the Union
(Member States). These operative treaties have been consolidated into one
unified document, 29 which combines two treaties: the Treaty on the
European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (TEC). 3 From time to time, an
Intergovernmental Conference is convened to develop amendments to the
treaties. The most recent conference adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, or
"constitution lite," which will impose more explicit energy responsibilities
on the EU institutions.
In a sense, energy drove the progenitors of the European Union. The
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 first brought
together the founding nations and created the prototype of pan-European
government. In 1957, as they formed the European Economic Community
(ECC), they also established a community more directly focused on energy:
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Still, it was not
until the 1992 Maastrich Treaty that the Member States identified energy as
a major EU concern. Energy has become one of the most pressing
problems confronting the European Union (and the world).
The Treaty of Lisbon/ 1 signed by the heads of EU Member States on
December 13, 2007, raised the status of energy in general perhaps to the
level of the original four freedoms. 32 The Treaty of Lisbon will add a new
Title XX. This title for now will add an Article 176A to the consolidated
treaty. Article l76A expresses, among other things, a commitment to panEuropean electricity industry. In paragraph 1 it states that EU energy
policy would be built around a "spirit of solidarity between Member
States." In particular, subparagraph l(d) provides that that policy shall
"promote the interconnection of energy networks."
According to
paragraph 2, these objectives are generally to be accomplished through the

°

PRIMER FOR U.S. LAWYERS ON EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNMENT AND LAW (2008),
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/euljan2008primerversionkoch.pdf.
29. Basic treaties: Go to http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm, then select
"European Union-Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community." (Both the "Treaty on European Union"
(TEU) & "Treaty Establishing the European Community" (TEC)).
30. When the Lisbon treaty comes into force the TEC will become the "Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union," http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm. A new
consolidated version of the Treaty will be created.
31. http://europa.eu/lisbon_treatylindex_en.htm.
32. The core of EU substantive law has developed from the "four freedoms": the free
movement of goods, workers, capital, and the freedom of establishment and service. The
law for each has evolved somewhat differently through legislation and judicial
interpretation.
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"ordinary legislative procedure," formerly "co-decision." 33 Under the
ordinary legislative procedure, legislative measures are adopted by a
"qualified majority" or weighted majority of the representatives of the
Member States under amended Article 251; hence an individual Member
State may not "veto" most energy legislation? 4
B. Legislative Development Toward a "Third Legislative Package"

Although establishing clear responsibility and competence, the Treaty of
Lisbon amendments provide only a framework. Thus, it is the legislative
process which will restructure the European electricity industry. 35 In 2007,
33. Currently, TEC Article 249 establishes three types of legislation: "regulation,"
"directive," and "decision." Regulations are binding without further Member State action.
Directives require further action. Decisions are only binding on those to whom they are
addressed. Article 251 establishes a complex procedure for enacting legislation in which the
Commission, Council, and European Parliament participate. This process will be changed
little when the Lisbon Treaty is ratified.
34. It is only for fiscal policy, under paragraph 3, that a unanimous vote of the
Members States is required.
35. For those unfamiliar with EU governance, a few words about the EU institutions
brought to bear on the electricity industry will be necessary. The EU has five key
institutions: the European Council, the Council of the European Union (Council), European
Parliament (Parliament), European Commission (Commission), and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ).
The European Council, distinct from the Council of the European Union, is made
up of the ministers of the Member States, the Heads of State or Government of the Member
States and the President of the Commission, assisted by the ministers for Foreign Affairs
and a Member of the Commission. TEU Article 4 provides, "The European Council shall
provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the
general political guidelines thereof." Thus, it is directly involved in developing the energy
agenda.
The Council exercises the legislative authority with parliament. Each Member State
(there are currently twenty-seven) is represented on the Council by a minister, depending on
the subject matter under consideration, who is authorized to commit their government. In
fact, the Council, although nominally a single entity, assembles in one of nine
configurations, one of which is Transportation, Telecommunication & Energy (TTE). Joint
action is taken by a vote of the representatives of the Member States. On energy matters, the
Council votes will be weighed in rough approximation of the state's population, known as a
"qualified majority." All the work of this Council is prepared or coordinated by the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).
The Parliament has joint legislative power with the Council. The Members of the
European Parliament (MEP) are the only directly elected EU officials. It has a committee
for "Industry, Research and Energy."
The Commission is the hub of the EU, having significant equivalent powers along
with most of the administrative responsibilities. The Commission is an active participant in
the legislative process and provides the bureaucracy that implements EU policies. The
College of Commissioners are nominated by the Member States and are often assigned
according to their expertise and/or the Member States' special interest in a subject area. The
Commission is divided into departments known as Directorates General, which are
responsible for a specific policy area and are headed by a Director General. The Energy
commissioner may have direct responsibility for electricity, but competition, environment,
consumer protection, and internal market are also involved in the development of energy
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the Commission sent forward its "third legislative package," dealing with
electricity and natural gas. 36 As the name suggests, these reports and
recommendations are the most recent iteration of the long electricity
restructuring process. They provide evidence that an internal market in
electricity is still very much a work in progress.
1.

Initial Legislative Stages

The process began before the first legislation, the "First Electricity
Directive."37 Development is said to have begun with a Commission paper,
"The Internal Energy Market" in 1988. The paper described a competitive
market in all the energy markets, including electricity. It helped begin an
"internal" pan-European market in energy. Parliament and the Council
adopted various energy directives. Two of these dealt with electricity. The
June 29, 1990 Directive 90/377/EEC sought to make the electricity market
more transparent, and the October 29, 1990 Directive 90/547/EEC focused
on the grid. 38
The so-called First Electricity Directive, Directive 96/92/EC of
December 19, 1996, was the first significant step toward an internal
electricity market. 39 This Directive attempted to deal with the various
complexities of restructuring the European electricity industry. The
directive left a good deal of the liberalization to the Member States. As in
the United States, this directive, for both legal and practical reasons, opted
for "functional unbundling."40 That is, vertically integrated firms were
required to separate their network operations from their other activities.
The directive, as in the United States, recognized the limitations on the
natural monopoly model. The Member States could choose to organize the
policy.
EU judicial authority is vested in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), assisted by
the Court of First Instances. The ECJ has yet to take a substantial role in the development of
energy policy. However, it has been a very active court and it can be expected to be
increasingly involved as the other EU and Member State institutions focus attention of such
matters.
36. ELECTRICITY GREEN PAPER, supra note 2.
37. For a more complete description of the evolution ofEU energy policy see Danwitz,
supra note 4, 433-40.
38. Americans should note that transparency connotes for Europeans a much broader
set of values than for Americans. For Americans, transparency is virtually synonymous with
openness. For Europeans, transparency includes not only openness, but also public
sensitivity, participation, and good administration in general.
39. Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 December
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market OJ L027 (30/01/1997) (hereinafter
96 Directive).
40. In addition to the impossible political obstacles as in the U.S., divestiture may
violate European human rights jurisprudence. See Danwitz, supra note 4, at 436-37. Some
Member State courts may find that ownership unbundling violates property rights
guaranteed by the national constitution.
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operating system either by negotiated supply contract (a regulated system
in which access was based on published tariffs), or by a "single buyer"
procedure in which the Member State designated an entity to be responsible
for transmission management with a territory. The Member States could
continue the "public service" principle, in which the company received
protection from competition in exchange for an obligation to satisfy certain
public service standards. However, this concept is in direct tension with a
free internal market in electricity because it burdens the internal market
with public-interest responsibilities. 41
The Second Electricity Directive, Directive 2003/54/EC, repealed the
First Directive.42 This Second Directive was based on the concept of
electricity as a service and hence accepted limitations on competition. Still,
it was intended to end distortions of competition caused by differences in
Member State regulation.
Most significant is the choice between
"negotiated" access under the First Directive and regulated network
access. 43 Under the latter approach, the European regime accommodated a
wide variety of different regulatory models.
Danwitz offers three
criticisms:
First, [the directive permits a] wide variety of obligations which member
states can impose upon companies under their authority to regulate in the
general economic interest.
[T]he Second Directive does not give member states any guidelines for
how to ensure that companies active in the energy markets will be kept
financially capable of providing services of general interest. Finally,
member states can decide not to apply fundamental provisions of the
44
Directive.

The directive also promotes renewables to address the climate-protection
concern.
Both the first and second package established the Transmission System
Operator (TSO) as the core of the bulk power transmission. The 1996
Directive found that,
[w]hereas each transmission system must be subject to central management
and control in order to ensure the security, reliability and efficiency of the
system in the interests of producers and their customers; whereas a
transmission system operator should therefore be designated and entrusted

41. See generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REv.
1233 (1998).
42. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive
96/92/92 (hereinafter Second Directive).
43. Germany is an example of the failures of negotiated approach. See Danwitz, supra
note 4, at 445-49.
44. !d. at 443.
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with the operation, maintenance, and, if necessary, development of the
system; whereas the transmission system operator must behave in an
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 45

It provides that
Member States shall designate or shall require undertakings which own
transmission systems to designate ... , a system operator to be responsible
for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, and, if necessary, developing the
transmission system in a given area and its interconnectors with other
. order to guarantee secunty
. of supp 1y. 46
systems, m

The EU has been committed to this path ever since.
The 1996 directive also required the creation of retail transmtsswn
entities called distribution system operators (DSOs). 47 These entities form
the delivery leg of the complete EU transmission system design,
marketing/distribution. Obviously, DSO operations are part of a complete
view of the European electricity system but their operation and
organization are beyond the scope of this paper.
2.

The Third Package

In 2007, the Commission submitted its third legislative package,
proposing amendments to the 2003 legislation. The process toward the
third package can be said to begin when the Commission published a
March 8, 2005 "Green Paper" on developing a common, coherent
European energy policy in response to a direction from the European
Council. 48 (The Commission engages its own and outside experts to study
an issue and often develops a Green Paper-a document intended to begin
discussion-particularly within the EU institutions.) 49
The legislative proposals attempt to correct defects in the regime brought
about by the existing legislation. Unfortunately, choices made in the prior
legislation make solutions more difficult. The choice of command-andcontrol regulation naturally results in even more intrusive and marketdistorting government intervention, as it did in the United States. The
collaborative governance model offers another way. It offers an alternative
that can and should be instituted by the European industry as it has been in
the United States. Again, as in the United States, regulators should
encourage their formation and then monitor their performance without
injecting themselves directly into operations.

45. 96 Directive, supra note 39, at 0025.
46. /d. at Article 7(1).
47. /d. at Article 10(2).
48. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 2, at 105.
49. A "White Paper" contains a proposal for specific action. White papers may but do
not necessarily follow a Green Paper.
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C. Implementing Measures the EU Way
The European industry is politically and, in general, technically
fragmented into twenty-seven national industries. 50 The legislative
packages envision implementing measures at the pan-European and
Member State levels? Unlike in the United States, the EU delegates most
pan-European implementing authority to the Member States. 52 This
"constitutional" choice fundamentally distinguishes the EU "federalism"
from U.S. federalism. 53 The European system relies on the Member State
legislatures and executive officials to implement EU law and hence results
in a quite different configuration of the European administrative system. 54
This basic distinction must be factored into the multistate aspects of the
model advocated here but not the not-for-profit aspects.
Despite the utilization of Member State administrations, EU law is
50. For a discussion of each national segment, see Commission Staff Working
Document Accompanying Document to the Communication for the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament: Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market,
SEC (2006) 1707 (10.1.2007). See, e.g., id. at 62 ("The opening of the [electricity] market
is still primarily theoretical in France.").
51. Agency categories recognize a coordination between national governmental
institutions and European institutions. Mario Chiti, The Emergence of a Community
Administration: the Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 309 (2000).
National agencies (which European scholars tend to lump together as "national regulatory
agencies" or "NRAs") perform much of the European administrative functions. A growing
number of EU agencies (European agencies or EAs) have taken on some of the
administrative responsibility but even so they tend to coordinate with NRAs.
52. As in the United States, delegation is the fundamental issue. Theoretically,
delegation of basic policymaking authority is prohibited. Meroni v. High Authority, [1958]
ECR II (1957-1958)] & [1958] ECR 53 (1958). See Jens-Peter Schneider, A Common
Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni Doctrine, 61 ADMIN. L. REv.
(SPECIAL EDITION) 29 (2009). In the United States, practicality has forced acceptance of the
exercise of broad delegations. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 371, 372 (1989)
("Applying the 'intelligible principle' test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."). EU Jaw has been going
through a similar evolution. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing
Policymaking in Network Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 167 (2007). To keep the theory alive
but capture the reality, the Treaty of Lisbon will distinguish legislative actions from "nonlegislative acts" or delegated implementing policymaking. See new Article 249B ("A
legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of
general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative
act.").
53. Europeans should note that the U.S. Supreme Court has absolutely prohibited the
"commandeering" of state and local legislative and executive branches. New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), invalidated federal efforts to direct state legislatures (even
though the states asked for it), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), invalidated
federal efforts to command state and local executive officials.
54. See generally Paul Craig, Shared Administration, Disbursement of Community
Funds and the Regulatory State, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Herwig C.H. Hofinann, ed.) (forthcoming June 2009).
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supreme when exercised. 55 To date, however, the Council and European
Parliament have not chosen to co-opt the Member State electricity
authorities. Indeed, EU legislative efforts have forced regulatory bodies
onto the Member States. 56 Thus, the European Union is actually imposing
the regulatory fragmentation that the United States is fighting to soften.
Existing and proposed legislative strategies do little more than authorize
cooperation among the Member State regulatory bodies. The Commission
has proposed no more than an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators. The Internal Market Proposal observes that,
[i]n practice, only a body emanating from the national regulators can catalyse
all the necessary resources of national regulators that is [sic] fundamental to
achieving success on these issues. The Commission is not in that position.
The Commission has concluded that the tasks required could be best
fulfilled by a separate entity, independent and outside the Commission. Both
the European Council ... as well as recent European Parliament resolutions,
endorse this conclusion. 57

Hence, a FERC-like agency does not seem in the immediate future of the
pan-European electricity industry. However, the European Union may
ultimately move toward a more intrusive European-wide energy
regulator. 58 At present, eliminating geographic fragmentation must be the
work of the industry itself, as in the United States not so long ago. The
ISO/RTO model offers the device for doing so.
V. BEYOND THE THIRD PACKAGE

Those who have been involved with the U.S. electricity industry since
before restructuring would say that the European Union is trying to do it
the hard way. We say so confidently because the United States was stuck
in the same box for generations. The EU vision is at base federalized
command-and-control regulation. This vision is the one the United States
is trying to escape. The way out for the United States has been a shift to
employing truly independent transmission-management bodies, which are
governed in such as way as to force sensitivity to the interests of all the
55. Although there is no EU supremacy clause, the European Court of Justice early on
in Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L 'Engergia Elettrica (ENEL) firmly established that
principle and has not been seriously challenged [1964] ECR 1141.
56. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive
96/92/EC, Article 23; Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges in electricity. See Note ofDG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and
2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Natural Gas, "The Role of the
Regulatory Authorities." (14/112004).
57. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 2, at 10.
58. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 2, at 6.
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stakeholders. The various levels of regulators then become the monitors
and ultimate guarantors of the public regarding performance. This
approach would better answer the goals identified in the Commission's
third-package proposals.
A. Escaping the Command-and-Control Box

The United States has eased out of the command-and-control box by
encouraging the industry to form itself around independent, not-for-profit
managers of the bulk transmission segment, the ISO/RTO model. The U.S.
industry itself in many regions was already moving to this basic
organization. Increasingly the industry depended on multistate, not-forprofit systems operators to provide market mechanisms while maintaining
the optimum transmission performance. This structure was attractive to
industry because it enabled competitors and stakeholders to work in concert
in their mutual interest.
In 1996, the federal government approach shift from adversarial
industry/government scheme to command and control began with the
foundational open-access regulation, Order 888. 59
That first step
recognized the public-interest advantages of collaborative governance in
the move to "unbundling." Unlike the EU Commission, FERC abandoned
reform strategies based on tightening command-and-control regulation. It
charged the industry with the task of working out a viable restructuring
plan which captured the efficiencies from coordination but structurally
mitigated opportunities for collusion and discrimination. In terms of
organization, FERC suggested only that it would look favorably on the
ISO/RTO solution. In Order 2000, it established a template for RTOs but it
still left to the industry the choice as to how structurally to accomplish the
unbundling and open-access goals. 60 The ISO/RTO solution increasingly
recommended itself to the industry as well as the regulators.
Several approaches were tried, including a separate for-profit
transmission operator, like the EU version of the independent systems
operator. Many practical difficulties doomed this alternative. From a
regulatory perspective, both FERC and the public doubted that these
bottleneck, for-profit transmission operators would avoid conflicts of

59. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May I 0, 1996) (hereinafter Order 888).
60. The main framework for the development of transmission organizations and hence
particularly relevant to this paper was provided by Order 2000, Regional Transmission
Organizations, 65 FED. REG. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (hereinafter Order 2000). In that order,
FERC established twelve characteristics and functions that an entity must satisfy in order to
become an RTO.
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interests. Simply put, it seemed inevitable that the traditional business
organization and the profit motive would ultimately drive these firms
toward self-interested conduct.
The EU Commission increasingly commits to a regulatory, commandand-control strategy. The proposals in the third package call for stronger
and more intrusive Member State National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs).
The "federal" aspect of the industry was confronted through cooperation
among these agencies. 61 It continues the trend to an ever larger role for a
pan-European agency but still not a pan-European electricity system. 62 As
was true in the United States, by relying on an adversarial governmental
scheme, the EU motivates the industry to act adversarially. The regulatory
fragmentation is perpetuated because a pan-European agency seems to face
significant, if not impossible, political obstacles. 63 The message from the
United States is that this strategy is not in the rational best interest of the
industry and the consuming public, although it might serve that of the
bureaucrats.
Rather than depending on a pan-European regulator or further
empowering the Member State regulatory bodies, the EU authorities might
consider encouraging the U.S. ISO/RTO model. 64 It is significant that in
the United States these entities were developed by the industry itself. After
generations of command-and-control schemes, FERC undertook in essence
a partnership with these private governmental bodies. This shift in
emphasis mitigates to a large extent a number of adversarial relationships
inherent in the command-and-control regime: that between government and
the industry; that between the industry and its customers; and that between
industry members of various size and functions. In contrast, the path taken
by the European Union pits the most dominant members of the industry
against consumers of all varieties-competitors as well as governments.
Customers in the EU scheme are left outside and hence can be expected to
act as adversaries.
After the unbundling, the generation and
retail/distribution segments also must assume an adversarial relationship
with the transmission segment. The collaborative governance organization
created by the ISO/RTO model tempers these adversarial tendencies.
EU legislation does not seem to preclude not-for-profit TSOs but simply
ignores that option. 65 As noted above, the EU institutions, on the
61. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 8.
62. See id. (listing regulatory powers).
63. Some evidence for this observation is the reaction to the proposal by telecom
commissioner Viviane Reding for a pan-European agency for that industry. Sarah Laitner,
Blow to Plan for Telecoms "Super" Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008.
64. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 8.
65. See Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 5N6 (discussing only the "two
options").
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recommendation of the Commission, have consistently centered European
restructuring on Member State-oriented transmission-system operators
(TSOs) as a for-profit business. U.S. open-access regulation leaves open
the option of for-profit transmission organizations (broadly known as
"transcos"), but those do not seem to survive. Perhaps destructive pressure
comes from the fact that the other stakeholders and regulators distrust these
business-motivated bottleneck entities. Indeed, it seems that even the
participating competitors reach a level of dysfunctional distrust that
ultimately ends each such endeavor. The U.S. experience may suggest that
closed, for-profit bulktransmission entities present negative incentives that
are hard to monitor through direct government regulation. Thus, this
option is in direct conflict with a system that is trying to downsize its
command-and-control approach.
The third package continues to center on the TSOs and that structure
could be the beginning of a viable solution. Unfortunately, the European
Union apparently assumes and accepts, as for years did the United States,
that these entities would be organized and governed as any other business. 66
The Commission proposal requires only that the TSO "consult" with
stakeholders. 67 On the other hand, in classic collaborative governance
fashion, the ISO/RTO model brings all the stakeholders into the actual
decisionmaking process, as can be seen in the discussion of PJM above. It
is little wonder that this model has expanded so rapidly, serving 67% of the
U.S. consumers and half of those in Canada. With those affected by the
management of the big wires directly involved in their management, there
is much more trust, and enhanced efficiencies result from the softening of
adversarial relationships and the diminished need for direct command-andcontrol regulation.
Again, the EU legislation may not preclude
stakeholder-governed bulk transmission entities, but it also does not
facilitate them. It should. More realistically, since government bodies
hanker after the power inherent in direct regulation, the industry itself
should develop and lobby for this option.
Replacing direct government regulation with the collaborative ISO/RTO
model also tends to foster reliance on objective, expert decisionmaking. A
decision must have sound technical support because all the stakeholders
have to buy into the decision. Advocacy and power become less important.
Decisions are more likely motivated by what is best for the system, and
hence society, rather than what is best for an individual business entity.
66. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 5-6.
67. See Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 15 ("[S]takeholders will be consulted
on any draft market and technical code prepared by the transmission system operators and
they will be able to comment on the annual work programme of the transmission system
operators." (emphases added)).
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Hence a look at the organization of the U.S. ISO/RTOs will discover a
myriad of broadly representative study groups and expert task forces.
B. Fair and Transparent Pricing
As stated above, electricity has been considered a "natural monopoly."
As such, the efficient organization would be one dominated by a single
firm with "market" pricing artificially imposed by government. Thus, in
the United States, the federal agency was required to assure that rates were
"just and reasonable" at the wholesale level and the state regulators did the
same at the state level. 68 The present EU approach does not so empower a
"federal" agency but delegates responsibility to the Member States.
Member States engage in rate regulation. 69
Regulating rates-setting nonmarket prices-has always been
complex. 70 By the end of the 20th century, energy policymakers in the
United States, both legislative and administrative, had determined that the
social costs of rate-making exceeded its social benefits. Since then,
policymakers have attempted to move toward market-driven pricing. The
ISO/RTO model has been instrumental in implementing market pricing in
the complex electricity market. FERC has encouraged the voluntary
participation in ISO/RTO by allowing those firms to rely on the tariff filing
of the ISO/RT0. 71 In Order 888, FERC offered a "pro-forma" open-access
tariff whereby transmission providers could comply with their new marketrelated obligations. The ISO/RTO form is encouraged in order to make it
easier to administer and enforce these obligations. Even though the states
continued to regulate retail prices, the ISO/RTO system promotes uniform,
market-driven prices for bulk-transmission access.
Europe has an advantage in that, at this point, it will not need to wean
itself away from a pan-European price regulator. Fortunately, its reform
efforts do not seem to envision such rate regulation. The third package,
and throughout the evolution of EU restructuring, focuses almost no
attention on pricing. Nonetheless, as bulk transmission escapes Member
State borders, pricing must also become a pan-European interest. The
68. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276 (1976) (explaining
that the Federal Power Act provides that the federal agency regulates wholesale and the
states regulate retail).
69. Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:
Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market COM (2006) 841 (covering all the
Member States but Bulgaria and Romania).
70. See, e.g., ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION (Harry M. Trebing
ed., 1971).
71. On February 16, 2007, the Commission issued Order 890 adopting certain refores
of the pro forma tariff.
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fragmented regulation, in fact required by EU legislation, means that panEuropean transmission must contend with various pricing schemes. Thus,
the Commission's approach to pan-European regulation seems the worst of
both worlds. Wholesale power will not be subject to European pricing
regulation, in contrast to the United States, but will be subject to Member
State rate regulation. For one thing, this fragmented price regulation means
that it will be much harder to dismantle bulk-transmission pricing schemes
defined by political rather than economic borders.
The elimination of retail price regulation is a more complex question not
apparently solved through the ISO/RTO model. Simply put, small business
and individual consumers do not seem to take advantage of market
opportumtles. Even though the ISO/RTO model includes consumer
representatives, it has not been successful in this regard. It probably is not
sufficiently sensitive to the weakness of· small industry and residential
representation. 72 Even if such a governance breakthrough could be
achieved, however, these consumers will likely continue to behave in the
market as they did under the integrated utility regime. Indeed, what
economists call "search costs" might make it irrational for them to behave
otherwise. Their welfare concerns are aggravated by the wholesale-retail
price squeeze. 73 Pricing throughout the network dictates retail pricing. If
care is not taken with network pricing, small business and residential
consumers are merely stuck between noncompetitive costs and competitive
or regulated prices. Retail marketers who potentially could make markets
for such consumers are powerless against this market- structure dilemma.
In short, U.S. states continue to engage in retail price setting, and it is hard
to argue against their doing so even though such price regulation artificially
fragments the market. A multistate solution would be preferable but does
not seem imminent.
Realization of a true pan-European internal market faces the same
"street-level" obstacles. The EU Commission might have hoped that the
DSOs would facilitate a viable retail market. Yet as the internal market
proposals found, "Neither in the electricity and the gas market is it yet
possible to speak of a European retail market (household and small
enterprise), as customers, assuming they have a choice, are still obliged to
72. For further discussion of this problem in the United States, see Charles H. Koch,
Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 589, 602-604 (2005) ("Fair RTO governance ... must assure that the small consumers
[small business and residential consumers] are not submerged within a universal 'consumer'
interest as defined by large industrial and commercial consumers.").
73. See Greg Goelzhauser, Price Squeeze in a Deregulated Electricity Power Industry,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 225, 241 (2004) ("Although electric power firms' rates are regulated
to some extent, a squeeze may arise due to actions of the differing bodies that set or approve
the rates: FERC at wholesale and state regulatory commissions at retail.").
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choose a supplier established in the same country."74 The third package
does attempt to confront the problems of the retail market, but the
Commission presentation can only be termed pessimistic.
Both systems then may have no alternative but to accept retail-price
regulation. True to the theme of this piece, it may be that the collaborative
governance of the ISO/RTO can be designed to offer a non-governmental
remedy. It cannot at this point be said that it has succeeded in doing so.
While it might seem that European and American consumers are different,
they may be similar enough to make a transatlantic dialogue on this
conundrum valuable to both.
C.

Viable Cross-Border Market

One aspect to true pan-European competitive pricing is allowing the
industry to reach its natural physical and market boundaries. Not only must
former national monopolies not be allowed to discriminate among
compatriots, but attainment of an internal market requires nondiscrimination within a pan-European industry.
Europe is already
significantly interconnected and those interconnections are increasing.
This condition parallels that in the United States during the initial stages of
the open-access project.
In both the United States and the European Union, as energy needs
overcome politics, the systems have become increasingly and more
transparently interconnected.
The Union for the Co-ordination of
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) has created a map showing the
physical energy flows between European countries, which is available on
the UCTE website. 75 A U.S. Department of Energy study, for example,
observed "three major interconnected power systems: the Eastern and
Western Interconnection, and the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) False Today, over 150,000 miles of high-voltage transmission
lines link generators to load centers through interconnected transmission
systems that span utility services, territories, states, regions, and the borders
of Mexico and Canada." 76 Similarly, as described below, Europe is
increasingly interconnected, and the grid naturally divides into multistate
regions not constrained by political borders. Practical impetus simply rolls
over these borders in the absence of overwhelming political will.
Still, the Green Paper observed: "Many markets remain largely national,
74. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 18.
75. Final Report, Implementation of TEN-E project (2004--2006): Evaluation and
available
at
Analysis,
figure
9,
http://www. ucte.org/_library/statsexchange/e_exchanges_2005. pdf.
76. U.S. Department of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study, 2-3 (2002),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transmission-grid.pdf.
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and dominated by a few companies. Many differences remain between
Member States' approaches to market opening, preventing the development
of a truly competitive European market false." 77 It asserted that consumers
"need a single European grid." The Internal Market Proposal suggests a
"supra-national" transmission operator. 78 However, it seems wedded to the
idea of cooperation among national TSOs rather than actual cross-border
entities. Among other things, its suggestion comes close but ultimately
misses the point by confining its thinking to interconnected systems of
industry participants segmented by national borders. It does not see that
the inability to think outside this particular box results in an unsatisfactory
level of interconnection. 79 Thus, while its first "concrete proposal" is the
development of a European Grid, it does not see the overarching
importance of the governance of that grid in accomplishing that goal. 80
These state-defined systems-even if physically interconnected-cannot
optimally serve the public interest. All EU institutions nominally support
transnational interconnects. 81 The TEN-E project study shows significant
advances in cross-border interconnections. 82 These interconnections
increasingly are aimed at power-market goals between national systems,
rather than only supplying security. 83 The EU recognizes the need for one
or more grids without political borders. The Commission observed the lack
of incentive to pursue all feasible and advantageous interconnections; 84 it
hopes that these business entities will cooperate. 85 As Adam Smith
observed some years ago, business people coming together is never good
for the rest of us. ISO/RTO enables grid cooperation with much less
opportunity to jointly act against the public or competitors. Indeed, it
evolved from business people, both industry members and their customers,
seeking an cooperative organization they could trust.
Fragmented regulation is also a major obstacle to an efficiently
organized internal market. The Internal Market Proposal laments the
difficult technical problems caused by the various Member State
regulations. 86 In the United States, a national regulator was already in
77. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 5.
78. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 7.
79. /d. at 6.
80. !d. at 18.
81. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 3.
82. MVV Consulting, "Final Report: Implementation of TEN-E Project (2004-2006)
Evaluation and Analysis" (27/7/2006).
83. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 19.
84. !d. at 4.
85. !d. at 13.
86. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 10 ("At present the technical rules that
electricity companies must operate under, 'grid-codes,' differ enormously between Member
States and often even within a single Member State.").
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place and it needed only to step back from direct involvement. Thus,
FERC could both mandate multistate solutions and withdraw commandand-control regulation in order to foster an industry unconstrained by
political borders. The industry-driven cross-border uniformity was a
natural result, and the not-for-profit entity, acting transparently and
inclusively, prevented collusion and discrimination. In the Green Paper,
the Commission promised to examine "whether existing forms of
collaboration between national regulators and national operators are
adequate, or whether a closer level of collaboration is needed-with for
example a European energy regulator to look at cross-border issues." 87
The Commission has proposed for an Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators. The lesson from the U.S. experience is that regulatory
cooperation will not get the job done.
D. Residual Market Manipulation

The Commission identifies a persistent problem with functional
unbundling: 88 "Firstly, the transmission system operator may treat its
affiliated companies better than competing third parties." As the
Commission further recognized, "This inherent conflict of interest is almost
impossible to control by regulatory means as the independence of the
transmission system operator within an integrated company is impossible to
monitor without an excessively burdensome and intrusive regulation." To
solve this problem the Commission's "preferred option.. . remains
ownership unbundling."89 As in the United States, ownership unbundling
meets strong resistance. Indeed, in some Member States it may be a
violation of fundamental rights. 90
Evidence from the U.S. experience is that even ownership unbundling
does not prevent discrimination against "outsiders" or collusion among
"affiliates." The ISO/RTO model includes "market monitoring" operations.
This self-regulatory regime is preferable to direct-conduct regulation and
the threat of direct regulation strengthens the hand of private-market

87. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 6.
88. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 4.
89. !d. at 5; see also Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 3-5 (separate shares for
each entity).
90. Danwitz, supra note 6, at 436-437:
As to the forced transfer of ownership to new legal entities: "The expropriation of the
network operators ... would require considerable restriction on fundamental property
rights of private companies which are protected both by European Law and by the
constitutional law of the member states .... "
As to transfer of control to independent entities, the German Constitutional
Court has held that option to be de facto expropriations because "the legal position
would be essentially worthless due to the complete loss of influence on the network."
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monitoring. Indeed, this possibility may be one of the reasons industry
members voluntarily committed themselves to this regime.
More
importantly, the industry is likely to police itself more efficiently and
effectively provided it has the incentives to do so.
Still, it is clear that some government oversight is desirable and
nonetheless inevitable. ISO/RTO market-monitoring operations offer a
self-regulatory remedy for discrimination and collusion, but this solution
has not answered all skeptics. Moreover, a substantial segment of the U.S.
market is not encompassed in an ISO/RTO model. Congress recognized
that market manipulation is still a factor in the U.S. electricity industry and
therefore enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct). 91 The EPAct,
among other things, gave FERC increased authority to issue rules to
prevent market manipulation in wholesale electricity transrnission. 92 The
Act empowers FERC to impose "civil penalties" for violation of these
rules.
The U.S. experience then suggests first that, to the extent possible, the
system should permit and encourage self-regulation. Thus, a broadly
representative private organization should develop the conduct rules and
enforce them. On the other hand, government regulators should not be far
removed. They must monitor these self-regulatory efforts. These
monitoring activities might take place at all governmental levels-federal,
state, and local.
Cooperation in monitoring, as opposed to direct
regulation, adds effectiveness as well as uniformity. Monitoring is then the
most efficient and effective regulatory role on both sides of the ocean.
Both systems should gravitate in that direction. The United States may be
coming at a new governmental role from a different direction than Europe,
but it is hard to say it is ahead. It may simply have done more to dismantle
and reconceive its direct regulation.
E. Access to Information

Information is the key to a viable electricity market and to preventing
market manipulation. Thus, FERC, in Order 889 (accompanying the Open
Access Order, Order 888), added rules establishing and governing an Open
Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS). 93 Its introduction
summarizes the rules:
[E]ach public utility (or its agent) that owns, controls, or operates facilities
91. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. See generally
Heather Curlee, Examining EPAct 2005: A Prospective Look at the Changing Regulatory
Approach of the FERC, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1649 (2006).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2006).
93. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996).
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used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce will be
required to create or participate in an OASIS that will provide open access
transmission customers and potential open access transmission customers
with information, provided by electronic means, about available transmission
capacity, prices, and other information that will enable them to obtain open
94
access non-discriminatory transmission service.

OASIS has proven a great success. The participation through ISO/RTO
operations has contributed greatly to its success.
A look at any of the ISO/RTO websites will show easy access to pricing
and service information. Readily available price and other market
information are necessary for the adequate function of the complex and
immediate electricity market.
Electronic capacity is also key to
collaborative governance. It fosters broad stakeholder involvement as well
as effective market monitoring. While there is still some information
asymmetry, it has been largely eliminated in ISO/RTO regimes. Moreover,
ISO/RTO implementation makes enforcement of transparency
requirements more effective and efficient.
F. Reliability and Long-Term Planning

Reliability and supply security are consistently at the forefront of
industry design in both the EU and the U.S. systems. These problems must
be and have been attacked in a variety of ways. Organizational design is
one of these. The market approach and the competition it engenders make
long-term capital investment risky. Few are willing to speculate on loads
that might appear some distance in the future. Coordinated long-term
facility planning always creates a dangerous potential for collusion and
discrimination. On the other hand, central government planning presents
its own dangers. As noted Harvard economist William Hogan observed,
Mandated investments not supported by market signals reveal or create
requirements for expanding the scope of central planning and regulatory
rather than market decisions.
[Because all] investments change the
economics of all other investments; mandated investments tend to reinforce
the distortions in price signals; the regulatory cure could be worse than the
market disease. 95

Among other things, an organizational design must be found that will
plan without compromising the market. Again, collaborative governance
seems to have proven to be the best foundation for that design. Because the
grids are necessarily interconnected, security and reliability are national or

94. !d. (emphasis added).
95. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, ELECTRICITY MARKET HYBRIDS: MIXED MARKET DESIGN,
REGULATION
AND
INVESTMENT
21
(2008),
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-whogan/Hogan_AEEE_O 11708.pdf.
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at least multistate problems. The larger and more multifaceted ISO/RTOs
can afford both to engage in long-term planning and carry forward the
results of those plans. For example, the !SO-centered Argentine Approach
has proven very successful in generating transmission investment. 96 An
ISO/RTO also has the scope to better protect its customers from immediate
breakdowns. For example, PJM was able to stop at the boundaries of its
grid the great Midwestern blackout a few years ago. Interestingly, the
breakdown stopped not at a state border but at the grid-management border.
Collaborative governance has had further impact on supply security in
the United States. The North American Energy Reliability Corporation
(NERC) is another private governmental-type entity that has become an
effective planning and load security mechanism. 97 NERC evolved from a
voluntary organization among industry members, began in the early 1960s
as the industry's effort to assure reliability among interconnected
transmission systems in North America. NERC describes itself as, "an
international, independent, self-regulatory, not-for-profit organization,
whose mission is to improve the reliability and security of the bulk power
system in the United States, Canada and part of Mexico."98 It oversees
reliability for a bulk power system for 334 million people, 830 gigawatts,
340,000 km long and $1 trillion dollars (U.S.) assets. Restructuring
naturally brought a distrust of an industry-dominated organization and
hence NERC began to insulate itself. In 2006, FERC certified NERC as
the "electricity reliability organization" for the United States and an
agreement was reached with the Canadian industry and reliability
organization. 99 It now fits even more perfectly into the collaborative
governance model.
The EP Act gave FERC new powers to oversee mandatory reliability
standards governing the nation's electricity grid. In order to carry out this
responsibility, FERC certified an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)
and established the procedures for the establishment, approval, and
enforcement of mandatory reliability standards. 100 The Commissionapproved mandatory standards will rely heavily on NERC standards. 101 The
96. !d. at 22 (quoting findings that "over the period 1993-2003 . . . transmission
capacity limits increased by I 05 per cent, more than sufficient to meet the increase in
system demand of over 50 per cent."). Stephen C. Littlechild & Carlos J. Skerk, "Regulation
of Transmission Expansion in Argentina Part I: State Ownership, Reform and the Fourth
Line," CMI EP 61 2004, at 56.
97. North American Energy Reliability Corporation, http://www.nerc.com/.
98. NERC, "Fast Facts," http://www.nerc.com/about/fast_facts.html.
99. The original organization became the National Electricity Reliability Council in
1968 and then the North American Electricity Reliability Council in 1981 and the current
"Corporation" in 2007.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006).
101. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Staffs Preliminary Assessment of the
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Act charges FERC to reform transmission pricing so as to promote
investment in electricity infrastructure. 102
Bulk transmission reliability faces political barriers that must be
mentioned even though they are beyond the scope of this piece. The EP Act
delegated new federal "siting" powers to FERC and the Department of
Energy (DOE). 103 It charges DOE to periodically study transmission
congestion and designated, if necessary, National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). 104 These powers will bring the federal
government in direct conflict with state and local authorities. 105 It is likely
that ISO/RTOs will have the local contacts that will ease the tensions for
those within their jurisdiction.
Throughout the various EU legislative and administrative stages,
concern for the adequacy of electricity supply is apparent. Both the Treaty
of Lisbon 106 and the third package focus on this problem. While the
collaborative governance model may well provide the best organizational
design, many other elements must be put in place to solve these problems in
Europe as in the United States. These other elements are beyond the scope of
this piece. It is within the spirit of this discussion, however, to observe that
nowhere is a transatlantic (and/or global) dialogue more necessary.

G. Industry- and Market-Participant-Driven Collaborative Governance
Creates Motivations Toward Conservation and Alternative Fuels
An efficient market optimizes the allocation of scarce resources. In the
United States, "demand response" programs by RTO/ISO are lowering the
demand for electricity. Their networks enable real-time balance of
generation and delivery, and this technology replaces some generation. A

North American Electricity Reliability Council's Proposed Mandatory Reliability Standards,
http://www. ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/05-11-06-nerc-assessment. pdf#xml=http://search.ato
mz.com/search/pdfhelper.tk?sp_o= I 0, I 00000,0.
102. However, pricing in order to benefit investment in bulktransmission facilities
presents serious problems. Indeed, that is why a simple market approach has not emerged.
103. Among other things, the Energy Policy Act of2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58,
119 Stat. 594, amending the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824p.
104. FERC has adopted rules for filing applications for transmission construction. DOE
has now identified two critical congestions areas: the "Mid-Atlantic NIETC" covers all of
New Jersey, Delaware, and D.C., most of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West
Virginia, and substantial portions of northern Virginia and eastern Ohio; the "Southwest
NIETC" covers parts of southern California and Arizona.
105. State public utility commissions and other officials testified against the two
corridors. E.g., Commonwealth of Virginia, Application for Rehearing of DOE Designation
Order, Docket Nos. 2007-0E-01, 2007-0E-02 (Nov. 5, 2007). Largely because of these
objections, DOE has ordered rehearing. National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor
Designation Order, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,202 (Dec. 7, 2007).
106. The Treaty of Lisbon would add TFEU section 176A, which is intended, among
other things, to "ensure security of energy supply in the Union." 176A I (b).
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recently released study, Harnessing the Power of Demand: How ISOs and
RTOs Are Integrating Demand Response into Wholesale Electricity
Market, shows the savings in electricity resources created by coordinated
grid management. 107 It notes that the ten American grid operators, which
serve two-thirds of U.S. customers, facilitate demand-response solutions by
conservation in place of hard assets. They allow special design and load
manipulation that may handle between 5% and 15% of peak load, reducing
the need for additional generation and decreasing transmission
congestion. 108 The devices for this demand response are varied and while
demand-response alternatives may not necessarily be linked to the regional
grid organizations, such organizations have obvious advantages in
implementing them.
ISO/RTOs also facilitate the development and utilization of renewables
and alternative fuels. 109 Renewable power sources have their own adverse
impacts and tend to be regionally feasible, intermittent, and seasonal.
Wind power in the United States is most efficiently generated on the
western prairie (where there are few consumers) or the coasts (where there
are scenic pollution problems). Solar power also has inherent locational
difficulties. Hydoelectric power not only destroys environments but is
subject to climate variations. The large integrated grid facilitates a
technology and geographic mix that optimizes alternative generation and
mitigates their disadvantages.
H. Collaborative Governance and "Third Countries"

The U.S. model seems to facilitate combination with contiguous nations
as well as U.S. states. As the DOE's "Grid Study" observed, the North
107. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, HARNESSING THE POWER OF DEMAND: HOW ISOs AND RTOs
ARE INTEGRATING DEMAND RESPONSE INTO WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2007),
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD% 7DIIRC
_DR_Report_101607.pdf; see a/so STAFF REPORT, DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED
METERING, at i, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/09-07-demand-response.pdf.
("Estimates of demand reductions in Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and
Independent System Operator (ISO) regions with organized wholesale markets lowered
system peaks between 1.4 and 4.1 percent on these peak days. These demand reductions
result from a combination of RTO/ISO demand response programs, utility retail demand
response, and voluntary customer demand reductions.").
108. Unless instant adjustments can be made in demand, assets must equal peak load.
See PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRICITY UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETIVE
ERA 53 (1997) ("To meet the essential condition that total generation instantly equals total
load, the power system in a given area must have a capacity as large as the highest moment
of total use, or peak demand.").
109. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, INCREASING DEMAND RESPONSE AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES:
How ISOs AND RTOS ARE HELPING MEET IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES (2007),
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD%7DIIRC
_Demand_Renewables_Glossy. pdf.
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American grid includes "the borders of Mexico and Canada." 110 Similarly,
NERC describes itself as, "an international, independent, self-regulatory,
not-for-profit organization, whose mission is to improve the reliability and
security of the bulk power system in the United States, Canada and part of
Mexico."'" Again, these cross-national borders' interconnections are
voluntary and driven by technical and economic realities when they are not
impeded by political borders. Perhaps the inclusiveness in the governance
process makes this more palatable.
The U.S. industry successfully joined regions of the Canadian industry
in cross-border collaborative governance. Alberta and Ontario have their
system operator, but Manitoba is within the Midwest ISO along with a
number of U.S. states. 112
In fact, this formal joint-organization
membership understates the coordination between the United States and
Canada. Much of this cooperation is conducted by ISO/RTOs in both
countries.
Indeed, the regional organization greatly facilitates this
cooperation. While electricity crosses the border between the United States
and Mexico, the arrangements seem less transparent.
In the United States, practicality compelled joint efforts in advancement
of organizational accommodates. The same forces seem at work
in Europe. For example, in the winter of 2008, France announced its
intention to form a "Mediterranean Union." As the Mediterranean
Electricity Ring map in the Final Report on the Implementation of TEN-E
projects shows, 113 in electricity that union is well underway. Exchange
among contiguous national industries seems irresistible.
The Green Paper recognized that the European Union, as all of us, must
see its energy task in a global and certainly neighborly perspective. 115 On
the other hand, the Internal Market Proposal provides that "[the]
commission proposes a requirement that third country individuals and
countries cannot acquire control over a Community transmission system or
transmission system operator unless this is permitted by an agreement
between the EU and the third country."" 6 Relevant to this paper, the
Commission also offers, "It may ultimately help to create supra-national
transmission operators as the operators are no longer held back by mutual

110. Grid Study, supra note 77, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
111. NERC "Fast Facts," supra note 98 (emphases added).
112. Midwest ISO, http://www.midwestiso.org/page/About%20Us.
113. Final Report, Implementation of TEN-E projects (2004-2006): Evaluation and
fig.
I 0,
available
at
Analysis,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/studies/doc/2007_1l_ten_e_evaluation.pdf (figure
10 is located on page 61 of the report).
115. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 19-20 (concrete proposal 6).
116. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 7.
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mistrust."m The U.S. experience with North American ISO/RTOs suggests
a model that will indeed enhance trust in a transnational industry.
Ownership dilemma may be lessened if the operation of the grids within
the European Union are managed by a transparent and inclusive
collaborative governance organization.

117. /d. at 7.

